INTRODUCTION
In this paper we shall be concerned with the theory of revealed preference understood in its original sense (Samuelson [19] ), namely, as a theory of rational consumer's behaviour in competitive market situations; (see Richter [18] for the formulation and development of a general, abstract theory). As with practically all previous work in the field we will focus on the relationship between the theory of demand derived from revealed preference analysis and the one based on preference maximization; we denote the latter theory as the preference hypothesis.
In 1938 Samuelson proposed as a new foundation for consumer theory the weak axiom of revealed preference (WA); the WA asserts that if a commodity bundle y is affordable, given a budget at which x is chosen (for short, if x is revealed preferred to y), then y cannot be revealed preferred to x. Although it has turned out that the demand theory implied by the WA is broader than the one generated by the preference hypothesis (Gale [6] ; see also, Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell, Sonnenschein [14] ) it is clear that they are conceptually close and their relationships were in need of clarification. The decisive step was given in 1951 by Houthakker [lo] . He introduced the strong axiom of revealed preference (SA) and convincingly argued its equivalences with the preference hypothesis. Roughly speaking, the SA postulates the cyclical consistence of the WA.
Since Houthakker's contribution the main line of research (see, for example, Uzawa [22] , Stigum [21] , etc.) has concentrated in finding sufficient conditions on demand functions guaranteeing that the consumer acts as a preference maximizer and his preferences are. completely " determined " by his choice behaviour. This programme calls for both the existence of preferences underlying choice and their uniqueness in some class (usually the class defined by the property of continuity) and it is clear that, to successfully complete it, conditions on demand functions (besides, of course, the SA) will have to be imposed. So far, positive results have been obtained by combining a substantive requirement, the well definiteness of indirect demand functions, with a quite weak regularity one, the income Lipschitz property (this term will be defined later on).
A second approach, initiated in different contexts by Richter [18] and Afriat [I] (see also, Hurwicz and Richter [12] ), recognizes that if one sets aside the uniqueness question, then the equivalence between the SA and the preference hypothesis can be established with the utmost generality. Thus, appealing to the set-theory based methods of Richter [18] , one directly gets that for any demand function satisfying SA there exists a preference relation rationalizing it. In the specific competitive markets framework in which we are interested one can go much further: for example, Afriat [I] has offered a method to compute, by linear programming techniques, a piecewise linear concave utility function in which demand is predetermined on any finite number of budgets; the only requirement is that the apriori given budget-choice combinations satisfy the SA. This is a very appealing result and prompts one to inquire to what extent its use as a practical method of ascertaining consumer's preferences could be justified; we will see that indeed it can under very mild conditions.
In this paper we attempt to exploit the just mentioned general existence results to make. the determinateness problem an easier and more tractable one, or, in other words, we try to bridge the approaches of the last two paragraphs by starting from the latter. It will be seen that the income Lipschitz property, which is a weak regularity condition, is the key for the successful accomplishment of this task. Considerable sharpenings of the available existence-uniqueness results will be obtained; in particular, no indirect demand conditions will be appealed to. Unrelated (at least explicitly) to revealed preference considerations the problem of the uniqueness of continuous preference rationalizing given demand functions has been studied elsewhere [IS] and, of course, the results there will be used here.
Consider any demand function h and a sequence of continuous, convex, monotone preferences 2,rationalizing h in a finite set of budgets Cn = {(p,, w,)) ; 2, may be obtained from Afriat's method. If C,, increases and becomes eventually " dense " and if h is continuous, then we show that one can naturally associate with the sequence &a, not necessarily unique, limit 2" which turns out to be an upper-semicontinuous, convex, monotone preference relation generating h (Theorem 1). Moreover, and this is the main result of the paper, if h is income Lipschitzian (in a certain sense) and either it satisfies a boundary condition or it is onto and non-inferior, then: (i) 2 * is in fact continuous; (ii) this 2 * is representable by a Lipschitzian, regular (this will be defined) utility function (this result is quoted from [15] ), and (iii) 2" is the unique upper semicontinuous, convex, monotone preference relation generating h (Theorems 2, 2', 3 and 4).
Precise definitions, many more details, discussion, and references to the literature will be given in the main body of the text. We may mention here that to avoid boundary complications our consumption set will be P = (x E R': x>>O).
DEFINITIONS AND STATEMENT O F RESULTS
We let P = (x ER': x>>O), V = Px(0, co).l Dejinition 6. A relation 2 c P x P is a preference relation if it is reflexive (i.e. x x for all x E P), complete (i.e. for all x, y E P, either x 2 y or y k x) and transitive (i.e. for all x, y, z E P, x 2 y and y k z implies x 2 2). For a relation 2 c P x P, x> y means x 2 y and ~( y A relation 2c P x P is : monotone if x>>y implies x>y ; k x) (i.e. no y 2 x). strictly monotone if x > y implies x>y ; convex if x 2 y implies tx+ (1 -t)y 2 y for t E [0, 11 ; strictly convex if x 2 y, x # y, implies tx +(I -t)y>y for 0 $ t 5 1; continuous if it closed in P x P ; upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) if, for all x E P, {yE P: y 2 x) is closed; lower semicontinuous (1.s.c.) if, for all x E P, {y E P: x 2 y) is closed. (ii) regular if for every x E P there is s>0 such that if y 2 x, then
For the definition of the topology of closed convergence and its use to formalize the notion of closeness of preference relations see Hildenbrand [9] , especially B.11 and 1.2.
DeJinition 10. Let k,,, 2 be continuous, monotone preference relations. We say that k,, converges to 2 , written k,,-+k, if when regarded as closed subsets of P x P, k, converges to 2 in the closed convergence (which defines a topology on the space of closed subsets of Px P).
The concepts described in the above definitions are for the most part well known. The relation W was introduced by Samuelson [20] , who postulated its asymmetry (the weak axiom of revealed preference); the SARP was first proposed by Houthakker [lo] , who formulated as well the income Lipschitz condition. Uzawa [22] noted that non-inferior demand functions were income Lipschitzian. The interest of preferences representable by Lipschitzian, regular utility functions (Definition 9) has been suggested in Mas-Cole11 [15] ; it is also shown there that the class of such preferences can be intrinsically characterized without reference to utility functions.
The first result is a revealed preference theorem for continuous demand functions: Theorem 1. Every continuous demand function which satisfies the strong axiom of revealedpreference can be generated by an upper semi-continuous, convex, monotone preference relation.
Next, a revealed preference theorem for income Lipschitzian demand functions. Theorem 2. Every continuous income Lipschitzian demand function which satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference and the boundary condition can be generated by a continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference relation.
It is possible to verify that if h satisfies the boundary condition, then h(V) = P.3 An example in the Appendix (a modification of one due to Hurwicz and Richter [12] ) shows that in Theorem 2 the boundary condition cannot be replaced by the weaker h(V) = P.
If " income Lipschitzian " is strengthened to " non-inferior ", however, the replacement can be made (or, what aposteriori is the same, under non-inferiority the boundary condition and h(V) = P are equivalent):
Theorem 2'. Every continuous, non-inferior demand function which satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference and the condition h(V) = P can be generated by a continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference relation.
We state now a uniqueness result which sharpens considerably the conclusion of Theorems 2 and 2'. It has been proved elsewhere (Mas-Cole11 [15] ).
Theorem 3. If a continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference relation generates an income Lipschitzian demand function h, then: (i) 2 is the unique upper semicontinuous, monotone, convex preference relation generating h, and (ii) 2 is representable by a Lipschitzian, regular utility function.
The combination of Theorems 2 and 3 yields the conclusion that underlying every demand function which satisfies SARP and is income Lipschitzian (and fulfils the BC) there is a unique, continuous (i.e. a " true ") preference relation. The next theorem implies that those preferences can be (approximately) constructed from a finite number of priceincome observations. More specifically, Afriat [l] (see also, Diewert [5] ) has shown that if C c V is finite and h I C satisfies the SARP, then there is a concave, monotone utility function generating demand choices, which, for every (p, w) E C, include h(p, w); moreover, this utility function can be computed as the solution of a certain simple linear programme. Our result adds to this that, provided the choice observations are taken from an income Lipschitzian h, the sequence of preferences induced by Afriat's utility functions as one keeps increasing (in a regular manner) the number of observations, will have a welldefined unique limit which is nothing but the theoretical true preference underlying h. Hence, we may conclude that the income-Lipschitz condition is the appropriate theoretical assumption (one obviously very weak) on which the attachment of operational significance to revealed preference analysis as a method of ascertaining preferences should rest.4 Remark 2. Consider the condition, denoted U for brevity, " h(V) = P and for every x E P, hP1(x) is a single ray ", it is easily seen that it implies the boundary condition and so Theorem 2 remains a fortiori valid if the latter condition is replaced by the former.
In this particular case where U holds Theorem 2 (with uniqueness) is a quite old one; it is the form that Houthakker gave to his theorem and it has been proved, with increasing rigour, by Hciuthakker [lo] , Uzawa [22] , [23] , Stigum [21] and, no doubt, others. Under the general condition of its statement (no " invertibility " assumption on demand), Theorem 2 (combined with the uniqueness given by Theorem 3) seems to be new.5
Remark 3. Observe that even for the case where condition U (Remark 2) holds, Theorems 2 and 4 yield a stronger conclusion than the one obtained by Houthakker and Uzawa. Preferences are not only continuous but also " Lipschitzian " in the sense introduced in [15] (i.e. they are representable by Lipschitzian and regular utility f~nctions).~ Remark 4. An attempt to derive some result analogous to Theorem 2' from Uzawa's [22] lemmata has been made by v. Moeseke [16] . It is our feeling, however, that no such thing is possible.
Remark 5. The attentive reader can verify that the proof of Theorem 2 goes through if the boundary condition is dropped and the Lipschitzian condition strengthened to:
" for every compact K c P there are reals E> 0 and r>O such that if ( p , w) E h-'(K) and I wl-w I < E , then 11 h(p, w) -h(p, w' )ll 5 r I w-w' I ". This condition has been introduced by Hunvicz and Uzawa [13] , who, with its help, established the analog of Theorem 2 in the integrability approach to the theory of " rational " demand (smoothness assumptions are made and the rationality axioms on demand are local ones, such as the symmetry and negative semidefiniteness of Slutzky matrices, rather than global ones as the SARP; see Hurwicz [Ill) . The condition is not as innocent as it appears; with the SARP it implies the conclusion of Theorem 2 and so the boundary condition should hold. Remark 6. If the hypothesis h(V) = P is dropped in Theorem 2' it can still be proved that h can be generated by a 2 which is monotone, convex, and continuous on h(V) (i.e. k n h ( V ) x h ( V ) is closed relative to h(V)x h(V)). No similar result for a case where h(V) # P holds with respect to Theorem 2.
A few words on the strategy of the proofs. Theorem 1 is established by combining the referred to result of Afriat with a limit argument. Theorems 2 and 2' are obtained by taking the preferences given by Theorem 1 and arguing by contradiction with a little help from convex analysis (the key fact is provided by the rules of differentiation of support functions). Theorem 4 follows, essentially, by combination of Theorems 1 and 3. We do not use (neither here nor in [15] ) the differential equations-type techniques, which have been popular in revealed preference analysis from its founding (we refer to the price-income sequences used by Samuelson [20] , Houthakker [lo] , Uzawa [22] , Stigum [21] and others) in order to construct preferences from demand functions. While local methods are appropriate for the integrability approach, which is based on local assumptions, it is probably more efficient, in revealed preference theory, to take advantage from the beginning of the global nature of the SARP and proceed by getting at once some preference relation generating the demand function under consideration; this is precisely what the very direct theorems of Richter [I81 and, in a more concrete setting, Afriat [I] allow one to do.
LEMMATA
Let Fbe the space of non-empty, closed subsets of P x P endowed with the closed convergence topology (see Hildenbrand [9] ). The subspace of g formed by the continuous, monotone, convex preference relations is denoted 9. The closure of 9in 9will be 9.
Forany k~g d e f i n e k * c P x P b y l e t t i n g y k * x i f a n d o n l y i f f o r a l l v~P , x k v implies y 2 v. Lemma 1. For any 2 E 9,k * is an upper semicontinuous, convex, monotone preference relation.
Proof. It is immediately verified that 2 E is closed, monotone, reflexive, and complete; moreover, for any x E P, {y: y 2 x) is convex (see, for example, B. Grodal [8] ).
Since {y : y k * x) = n {y: y k * v) it is clear that k * is reflexive, transitive, upper X~* V semicontinuous, convex, and monotone. To check that k * is complete we argue by contradiction: let x v, u>y, y u, u>x (implying l ( x k * y) and ~( y By k * x)). definition, there are x,+x, y,-+y, u,+u, u,+v, such that x, 2, v, and y, 2, u,,; for 8 large enough v, >, y,, u, >, x, and so, we get x, >, x,, which is impossible. jj
1V.B. For the rest of this section h is a fixed, continuous demand function.
Lemma 2 (Afriat) . Let Cc V be afinite set; then there is k E 9 such that for every (p, w) E C,h(p, w) is a maximizer of 2 on {y: py 5 w).
Proof. Afriat [1] see also, Diewert [ 5 ] . jj 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
By the continuity of h there is a sequence ( p , , w, ) E C such that (p,, w,)+(p, w) and, letting ym = h(p,, w,), one has p,x<w,, py,< w. (Figure 1 indicates how the sequence can be constructed.) Obviously, y,+y and, letting (p,, w, ) E Cnm, ym knm SO, y X. X.
(Note: x being arbitary, we can conclude here that pv 5 w implies y 2 0.) Now take an arbitrary m and let z>>y,, pz j w if x 2 z there is x,+x, z,+z with x, k,z,, but, for sufficiently large n, z, >, y, 2, x, (remember C,c C,, c ...) and we have a contradiction. Therefore, z > x. Since y k z (because pz 5 w) we conclude l ( x k * y), or y >* x. Proof. Denote y = h(p, p(x, p)). By the definition of p there is x,+X E H such that x, 2 x and pX = p(x, p). By Lemma 5, 2 = y and so, by the U.S.C. of k , y 2 x. Hence, y E O(X, p) ; a(x, p) c{y) follows trivially from Lemma 5. 11
Lemma 7. For every x E P andp >0, y(x, p) is continuous on p; moreover, ifp>>O, then p(x, p) is (continuously) dzJ6erentiable on p and V,p(x, p) = ~( x , p) = h(x, p(x, p)).
Proof. This is a standard result on the continuity and differentiability of support Lemma 10. Let 2 be convex. If, for every x, y E P and p>O, o(x, p)na(y, p) # 4 implies p(x, j ) = p(y, p) for all j E P, then 2 is continuous.
Proof. Let xn+y, x 2 x,, y>x. Then, on account of monotonicity, y belongs to the boundary of the convex set {v E P: v 2 x) ; take p >0 such that if v 2 x, then pv 2 py. We have y E a(x, p)na(y, p). Now take x'>>x such that y>x' (remember k is u.s.c.) and let p>O separate x' and {v E P: v 2 y) (i.e. v 2 y implies pv 2 px'). Then Ax, P) 5 px<Px1 6 P(Y, F), which contradicts the assumption of the lemma. Therefore, " xn+y, x 2 x, " implies x 2 y and 2 is lower semicontinuous; since is an u.s.c. preference relation, it is continuous. /I
PROOF OF THE THEOREMS Proof of Theorem 1
Let C, c Cn+,c .. . c V be a sequence of finite sets such that U C, is dense in V. For every n n pick knE 9 'according to Lemma 2. Since B is closed convergence compact (see Hildenbrand [9] ) we can assume kn+2eB. By Lemmas 1 and 3, k * is as desired. I/
Proof of Theorem 2
Let k be an upper semicontinuous, monotone, convex preference relation generating h (Theorem 1). We apply Lemma 10 and argue by contradiction. Define p and a as in the lemmata and suppose that v E o(x, p)no(y, p), p(x, p) >p(y, p) for some x, y E P and p, p >0. and v by h(p(i), p(p(i), x))) we can assume that e(t)>O for O<t 5 1. By Lemma 7 e is continuously differentiable on O < t < 1 ; denote by <'(t) the derivative of t. If sup <m, then = log e(l) -log e(0) <m, which is impossible, since e(0) = 0
and ((1) >0. Hence there is a sequence tn, O < tn 6 1 such that 50 +m. Since <(t) >0
<(tn> for t> 0, we can assume by the same argument that tn+O. Denote then w, # w;, Z, # z;. By Lemma 7, t1(tn) = ( p-p)(z, -z;). Therefore, (P-F)(zn -z@+* I w n -4 I Z,-z; is bounded, we have ' I +m, or, rewriting, I wn-w; I '(pH, wn)-h(pn2 wa +m, pn+p, w,+w, and w;+w, which contradicts the fact that h is I w..-wi. I incomk ~i p s c k z i a n . Hence we conclude (Lemma 10) that 2 is continuous, strictly monotone, and strictly convex (Lemmas 8 and 9). 11
Proof of Theorem 2'. Let be an upper semicontinuous, convex, monotone preference relation generating h (Theorem 1). Define p and o as in the lemmata. We show that x 6 P , p >0, and o(x, p) # 4 implies p>>O. Once this is established, we can apply the proof of Theorem 2 without modification (the BC was only used to get p>>O) and obtain the continuity of 2. But, together with h(V) = P, this is easily seen to imply strict monotonicity and convexity.
Let x E P, p >0, X' E o(x, p), J = {j: p j = 0). The proof is divided into three parts.
(1) There is y E P and p>>O such that, letting p, = tp +(1-t)p, y = h(p,, p,y) for every 0 s t < l .
TO see this let x' = h(p', p'x'), p; = tp+(l -t)pr; for every 0 6 t <1, h(p;, pix') 2 x' and so ph(p;, p;xr) 2 px', which implies plh(p;, pix') s yrxr. Therefore, {h(p;, p;xf): 0 5 t <1) has a limit point x" E P ; then px" = px' and, denoting y = +x' +$x" E P, we have, by the convexity and the upper semicontinuity of 2 , that py = px' and y 2 x'. Take p>>Osuch that y = h@, py). Then (definingp, as in (I)), ifp,v 6 p,y, t < 1, either pv 5 py orpv<pxf ;
in both cases y 2 v. So, y = h(p,, p,y) for 0 5 t <1. Hence hi(p,, w) 2 y. So, take E = min (612, y).
Finally,
Let t,+ 1 and denote p, = p,,,. Take py -E <E<py and a decreasing sequence w,+E with w, <py. For every my {h(p,, wm)),"= ,has a limit point in P because h is non-inferior and, for large enough n, w,<p,y (i.e. h(p,, w,) 5 y). Let it be urn, then pv, = w, , v, f y, and u; 2 E for j 6J. Let v E P be a limit point of {urn),": ,. We have pu = 3 and vJ>O for j 6J. Define 6 E P by fij = v j if j 6J and 6j = vJ+ l if j E J; then p6 = E. Now, for every m and N, large enough, if n >N, , then w, >p,6 ; so, by the upper semicontinuity of k , urn 2 6 for every m and u 2 6. If 6 # v, then, since h(V) = P and 6 2 v, 6>v, a contradiction. Therefore, u = 6, which implies p>>O. Ij
Proof of Theorem 4.
Since P compact, (k,),"= ,has an accumulation point k E g. By Lemma 3, k * generates h and by Lemma 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, k * is the unique relation in 9 which generates h. From the definitions, x k * y implies x 2 y ; by the completeness of 2 and >*,x2.y implies x k * y. Hence, by the monotonicity of k , 2 is the closure of k * ; N but &* is closed, so 2 = k * . Hence 2 E 9is the unique element of 9which generates h. Therefore, since {k,),"= ,has a unique accumulation point, k , + k . Ij APPENDIX The purpose of this appendix is to show how the example in Hurwicz and Richter [12] can be easily modified in order to obtain an income Lipschitzian and continuous demand function h satisfying the SARP and h(V) = P but which cannot be generated by any continuous preference relation.
In Figure 2 the curve I is the graph of:
In region A (above I) the preference map of the Hurwicz-Richter example is drawn. The Engel curves are indicated. The preference relation is (so far) u.s.c., but it will necessarily fail to be continuous along I from v to the right (line If).
In region B (below I) we want to find an indifierence map which associates with every z E (-1, 0) the Engel curve determined by the segment connecting (z+ 1, (z2/2)+ 1) and (-(z+ l)/z, 0). Two distinct segments of those do not intersect, and as z ranges over (-1, 0) the segments cover the whole of B. Hence a function 4 : B+(-1,0) is well defined.
Since the slope of f ( x ) at x = z + 1 is z, this should be the indifference-curve-slope associated with the Engel curve passing through (z-t 1, (z2/2)+ 1). We can write --dy = $(x, y).
dx If the preference map on A can be so extended to an u.s.c. preference relation 2 it is easily checked that the generated demand function h is income Lipschitzian (the Engel curves are piecewise linear and, when defined, the gradient vector of h at (p, w) is continuous with respect t o p and w), that 2 is the only u.s.c. preference relation generating h and that h( V) = P.
